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Abstract
Background: Prior to the 2009 pandemic H1N1, and the unprecedented outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI) caused by the H5N1 virus, the World Health Organization (WHO) called upon its Member States to
develop preparedness plans in response to a new pandemic in humans. The WHO Member States responded to
this call by developing national pandemic plans in accordance with the International Health Regulations (IHR) to
strengthen the capabilities of Member States to respond to different pandemic scenarios. In this study, we aim to
evaluate the quality of the preparedness plans in the WHO African region since their inception in 2005.
Methods: A standard checklist with 61 binary indicators (“yes” or “no”) was used to assess the quality of the
preparedness plans. The checklist was categorised across seven thematic areas of preparedness: preparation (16
indicators); coordination and partnership (5 indicators); risk communication (8 indicators); surveillance and monitoring
(7 indicators); prevention and containment (10 indicators); case investigation and treatment (10 indicators) and ethical
consideration (5 indicators). Four assessors independently scored the plans against the checklist.
Results: Of the 47 countries in the WHO African region, a total of 35 national pandemic plans were evaluated. The
composite score for the completeness of the pandemic plans across the 35 countries was 36%. Country-specific scores
on each of the thematic indicators for pandemic plan completeness varied, ranging from 5% in Côte d’Ivoire to 79% in
South Africa. On average, preparation and risk communication scored 48%, respectively, while coordination and
partnership scored the highest with an aggregate score of 49%. Surveillance and monitoring scored 34%, while
prevention and containment scored 35%. Case investigation and treatment scored 25%, and ethical consideration
scored the lowest of 14% across 35 countries. Overall, our assessment shows that pandemic preparedness plans across
the WHO African region are inadequate.
Conclusions: Moving forward, these plans must address the gaps identified in this study and demonstrate clarity in
their goals that are achievable through drills, simulations and tabletop exercises.
Keywords: National preparedness plans, Pandemic influenza, Africa, Quality of the plans, Surveillance, Containment,
Communication, Ethical framework, Treatment
Background
Pandemic influenza is a rare disease caused by a novel
influenza virus, a subtype that has the capability to cause
sustained human-to-human transmission and to which
the population has no or little immunity [1]. Historically,
there have been 31 possible influenza outbreaks since
1580, occurring approximately once every 15 years [2],
with 3 occurring in the twentieth century: the outbreaks
of 1918, 1957, and 1968. The 1918 pandemic influenza
outbreak was the most devastating, causing between 50
and 100 million deaths worldwide [3]. In Africa, the pan-
demic influenza fatality count was 2.3 million deaths,
which is deemed to be underreported [4]. The 1957 and
1968 pandemic influenza in Africa caused about 2–3
million and 1 million excess deaths, respectively [5]. In
the twenty-first century, an influenza pandemic occurred
in 2009 causing 18,156 deaths globally [6].* Correspondence: Evanson.Sambala@mrc.ac.za1Cochrane South Africa, South African Medical Research Council, Box 19070,
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The highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) does
not usually infect humans, but poses a great threat in
spillover from animal to human population, often with
fatal outcomes when humans are infected. Between 1990
and 2000, avian virus H5N1 actively circulated uninter-
rupted among migratory birds and animals in Asia, Eur-
ope and Mediterranean, thus giving the prospects for a
serious influenza pandemic outbreak in humans [7].
Following these threats and the anticipation of another
pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) re-
quested Member States to develop preparedness pan-
demic plans to ensure countries are equipped to
mitigate the challenges a pandemic would present. This
call was timely, given the limitations of the existing glo-
bal influenza surveillance and monitoring system to re-
spond, deploy and implement activities to mitigate the
impact of an outbreak [8].
In 1999, the WHO published the first guiding princi-
ples for pandemic influenza preparedness [8]. These
guidelines subsequently underwent revisions in 2005 and
2009, incorporating the practical outbreak response ex-
periences gained from outbreaks of avian H5N1 and
2009 H1N1 influenza [9, 10]. These guidelines provide a
framework for organising preparedness and response ac-
tions. The WHO recommends that, as Member States
develop or update their national plans, they should con-
sider the proposed phases in the context of
country-specific needs, priorities and actions.
Based on the WHO resolution issued in April 2005
[11], many countries in Africa drafted their national
plans between 2005 and 2007, and subsequently used
the plans to respond to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in-
fluenza. However, there is insufficient information on
how the preparedness plans were utilized during the
2009 H1N1 pandemic and the lessons that were
drawn to improve responses to the next pandemic.
Furthermore, since the inception of these plans into
action, no study has evaluated the quality of 2009
post pandemic preparedness plans in the WHO Afri-
can region. The purpose of this present study was to
evaluate the completeness of the preparedness plans.
We postulated that planning for a pandemic influenza
is only as satisfactory as the assumptions on which
they are proposed; thus studying them is necessary.
Findings from this study will be used to highlight
areas of the plans that need strengthening and
improvement.
Methods
We searched the electronic databases of the WHO and
United Nations (UN) plus grey literature for the avail-
ability of the national pandemic influenza preparedness
plans from the WHO African region that were published
between 2005 and 2017. In instances where the plans
were not available online, we contacted the Ministries of
Health in the respective countries for their plans. We
considered countries that had plans for avian or human
influenza, or both. We excluded plans that were not in
public domain. Pandemic influenza plans are a blueprint
for managing the emergency outbreak and, as such,
should be shared with citizens and stakeholders to in-
form them about their roles and responsibilities in
responding to a possible threat [12].
We translated plans written in French into English
using google translation software. Where two national
plans for a country were available, we read, assessed and
treated both the draft and updated version of the plan as
a unit. Four assessors (TK, CJI, CDI and AJ) independ-
ently read and scored the plans; disagreements or dis-
crepancies that arose during assessment were resolved
by a fifth and sixth reviewer (EZS and CSW).
A standard checklist with 61 binary indicators (“yes”
or “no”) was used to assess the quality of the prepared-
ness pandemic plans. The checklist, shown in Table 1, is
grouped across seven thematic areas: preparation (16 in-
dicators); coordination and partnership (5 indicators);
risk communication (8 indicators); surveillance and
monitoring (7 indicators); prevention and containment
(10 indicators); case investigation and treatment (10 in-
dicators) and ethical consideration (5 indicators).
The indicators used to assess the African plans
were developed partly from the 20 key indicators on
various goals of preparedness recommended by the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) and WHO Regional Office for Europe [13].
A group of 25 European countries plus Iceland and
Norway through a consultative process provided
feedback on the content validity of the 20 indicators
[13]. Additional indicators specific to the purpose of
our study and setting was pulled together by incorp-
orating other recommendations from the WHO
guidance on pandemic plan development [13, 14].
The final instrument was validated by pandemic pol-
icy planners in 7 select countries with a validity
index score of not less than 0.75.
Each plan assessed would score a maximum of 61
points for completeness across the 7 thematic areas of
preparedness. We generated descriptive data, such as av-
erages and percent of total, to gauge quality of pandemic
preparedness plans. An overall plan score was calculated
by assigning 1 or 0 points to each indicator. An indicator
score of one is assigned to the plan if denoted by “yes”
and zero for “no”. The indicator was scored 1 if an item
was mentioned in detail or partly described in the plan,
while a score of 0 was given if the item assessed was
missing or absent in the plan. All the scores were veri-
fied before entry in excel by two reviewers (EZS and
CDI) prior to analysis.
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Table 1 Standardized checklist and scores for 61 indicators grouped across seven categories
INDICATORS RATIONALE SCORES
Additional assessment guide Number of countries
Yes No
PREPARATION
1 Does the country have a national
pandemic influenza plan?
Is it publicly available? 35 0
2 Does the national influenza plan
target human or avian influenza subtypes?
Human influenza subtype
e.g. H1N1 and animal subtype e.g. H5N1
32 3
3 Does the national pandemic
influenza plan meet the international
(WHO/IHR etc) guidance on preparedness?
Is the plan based on the six phases
of planning and response?
22 13
4 Are the responsibilities and actions
in the plan defined phase by phase?
This is required for capacity setting,
planning and command based
on WHO recommendations.
21 14
5 Are there local plans at
district and regional level?
See if are there any arrangements in place 9 26
6 Are business continuity plans
available across the non-health
sectors at national and regional
levels? Or are these mentioned in the plans?
Check this among institutions (UN
organization and churches etc).
Do these plan mention how they
will cope with an influenza pandemic
and continue to provide other
essential health services.
7 28
7 Are the plans flexible? Does the plan have a severity
index or are they able to adjust
whether to mild or severe
nature of the pandemic?
13 22
8 Do the response and inter-wave
planning phases have their own
courses of action and budgets
which would be implemented?
These tasks should have financial
and human resource with a
budget provision for a year.
Also see question 4
24 11
9 Is the plan sustainable for a longer term? Influenza funding and development
of command structures should
not heavily rely on external funding.
0 35
10 Does the plan have a national
committee(s) or advisory
body in place to oversee preparedness?
Check who drafted the plan and
if they were part of the committee.
32 3
11 Does the plan have any assumptions
on which the plan is based?
Does the plan mention the expected
range of cases and percentage of
staff off sick? Check for detailed
assumptions and planning principles
such as case scenarios that will trigger
responses and guide effective
implementation of the plan.
14 21
12 Are there a national command
and control structure?
This is where data or information
is aggregated for the country.
The national command centre
exercise authority and can
designate responsibilities
at the local or regional levels.
25 10
13 Are there health services command
and control structure?
Check for hospital and clinic plans 8 27
14 Does the pandemic plan regularly
and systematically get tested at
all levels and across all sectors i.e.
national level health sector exercises or drills?
Check if they carry out simulations
and tabletop exercises- this is
important because it can feedback
in the planning as lessons learnt.
8 27
15 Have the legal implications of
travel restrictions and other
interoperability issues been determined?
Are there any discussions or
agreements on a list of issues
such as cross-border management
and quarantine?
15 20
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Table 1 Standardized checklist and scores for 61 indicators grouped across seven categories (Continued)
INDICATORS RATIONALE SCORES
Additional assessment guide Number of countries
Yes No
16 Do interventions proposed in the
plan have exit strategies?
What are the exit options?
When should the pandemic
be outbreak declared over?
4 31
COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIPS
17 Are there any regional or local
arrangements in place on how to respond?
Do plans engage local people,
families and medical personnel
to ensure local services are
running smoothly during the
pandemic period?
24 11
18 Are there a regional/local planning
and coordination structure?
Check for leadership roles and
designation of responsibilities
among the coordinating structures.
24 11
19 Is the health sector well connected
to other sectors such as businesses
and civil society?
Private and public partnership
necessary to continue providing
essential services such as water,
energy and safe transport.
12 23
20 Are there joint cooperation and
partnership with the neighboring
countries on mutually
relevant influenza policy areas?
A pandemic outbreak has no
borders- check how transborder
problems related to pandemic
influenza will be resolved or if
it is a priority in the plan.
10 25
21 Does the partnership or
coordination involve financial
and technical support?
This is important for planning
continuity purposes and
future responses.
16 19
RISK COMMUNICATION
22 Are they a national communication
strategy or is it publicly available?
Has the national communication
strategy been published?
22 13
23 Does the national communication
strategy sufficiently stress the likely
nature or duration of the pandemic,
its spread, its peak and decline,
nor does it sufficiently inform
the public on these issues?
Is the national communication
strategy committed to public
awareness including communicating
the nature, spread, peak and
decline of influenza
(seasonal and pandemic?
11 24
24 Are there any Information Education
and Communication (IEC) material
or IEC in place or available?
Check if the plan use or intend
to use multi-media communication
i.e. newspapers, radio, TV, posters,
magazines and social networking
sites such as Facebook and Twitter
31 4
25 Are there any definitions of key
target groups for specific preventive
messages and protection such
as health and emergency personnel
within the communication plan?
Are there any public hygiene campaigns
to highlight the personal public
health measures during normal
influenza seasons or outbreaks?
23 12
26 Are there effective programmes
in place to change public attitudes
and perceptions about influenza?
To avoid problems due to poor
messages on preventive measures
and general hygiene etc.
12 23
27 Are churches or religious groups
mentioned in the plan to help
communicate preparedness messages?
People are more likely to listen to
a religious leaders than
from health personnel.
8 27
28 Are there a nation-wide influenza
guidance ‘intranet’ for health
authorities respond quickly
to an influenza outbreak?
Web reporting systems? 9 26
29 Is information exchanged with stakeholders? Are conferences, meetings and
forums mentioned for information
exchange and sharing?
17 18
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Table 1 Standardized checklist and scores for 61 indicators grouped across seven categories (Continued)
INDICATORS RATIONALE SCORES
Additional assessment guide Number of countries
Yes No
SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING
30 Are there surveillance systems in
place for collecting and
sharing of virological and
epidemiological data with the
WHO and other partners?
Check for Integrated Disease
Surveillance Response (IDSR) and
check if such data is shared?
18 17
31 Are there a national laboratory
or national influenza centre (NIC)
or Influenza assessment centres
(IAC) for collecting epidemiological
data on Influenza Like Illness
(ILI) and Severe Acute
Respiratory Infections (SARI)
The national laboratory capacity
is important to provide timely,
high quality, validated routine
and diagnostic influenza data.
ILI and SARI are indirect measures
for influenza- and there are good
indicators for pandemic preparedness.
18 17
32 If yes in 31, does the national
laboratory have the capacity
to perform: Virus isolation?
Influenza typing? Influenza s
Check these at the national and
administrative regional level.
13 22
33 Are there a PCR machine for
testing/sequencing of seasonal
and pandemic influenza viruses?
Relevant for monitoring viruses
and for estimating additional
resources that might be required
to tackle pandemic influenza problem.
9 26
34 Are there a national “Early
Warning” systems or
Event Based Surveillance (EBS)
Are they a computerised hospital
system that can readily give
age-specific mortality data in real time?
6 29
35 Is the virological and epidemiological
data shared with partners/WHO?
Are they an influenza web reporting system?
Check if they have a FluNet and
FluID reporting systems.
4 31
36 Are they a surveillance working group(s)? A team of specialized expertise/
epidemiologists to advise on the
planning and response etc.
See also question 10.
16 19
PREVENTION AND CONTAINMENT
37 Are non-pharmaceutical intervention
plans in place? i.e. closure of schools,
ventilators, PPEs, quarantine, isolation,
hygiene and sanitation.
Are prevention and cluster control
plans in place (i.e. for border and
stamping influenza out prior to
widespread in the country.
26 9
38 Are pharmaceutical interventions
in place? i.e. use of vaccines,
antivirals and antibiotics
for secondary infections
Check for vaccine strategy if in place? 29 6
39 Are there a procurement strategy
of pharmaceutical (vaccines)
and non-pharmaceutical products (PPEs)?
Check for political intervention
to improve pharmaceutical
logistics in acquiring
vaccines and other drugs.
17 18
40 Are there contracts and
agreements with pharmaceutical
companies for the supply of
equipment and drugs for
influenza preparedness capacity?
Check if there are vaccine and
antiviral drug contracts and
agreements with the
pharmaceutical companies.
2 33
41 Are there a pharmaceutical
(vaccine) strategy
If a pandemic vaccine is planned
to be used when will the vaccines
arrive in health centres? Is it within
six months of the start of the pandemic?
12 23
42 Are there accelerated regulatory
approvals of influenza vaccines
for quick deployment? Or are
there a national regulatory capacity
in place so that vaccines, diagnostic
Some countries deploying
influenza vaccines are required
to meet the preconditions for
supply of vaccines through
the WHO Deployment Initiative.
3 32
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Table 1 Standardized checklist and scores for 61 indicators grouped across seven categories (Continued)
INDICATORS RATIONALE SCORES
Additional assessment guide Number of countries
Yes No
tests and antiviral medicines for
influenza can be deployed quickly?
43 Are there any additional (surge)
capacity to improve responses
through training and increasing
human resource capacity?
Are there a standardised
national educational materials
for all health care workers?
21 14
44 Are there effective hospital control policies? Do hospitals or health centres
have their own plans?
5 30
45 Are there plans for recruiting
volunteers from local communities?
This is necessary in case of
staff absenteeism during
the pandemic period.
2 33
46 Are there a reserve list of health professionals? Necessary in case of staff absenteeism
during the pandemic period.
4 31
CASE INVESTIGATION AND TREATMENT
47 Are there any scientifically-based
estimates of the numbers of people
likely to be affected by pandemic
influenza and needing
medical and social care?
These estimates contributes to
the planning of resources and
for efficient and equitable
deployment of vital supplies
for pandemic influenza.
8 27
48 Are there a list of critical information
that is needed early in a pandemic
(e.g. attack rates by age and locality,
strain type, likely antiviral sensitivity,
response to antivirals and public
health measures, etc)?
What is the proportion of the
population that may need
treatment i.e. target groups
for prophylaxis?
9 26
49 Are there criteria for the types and
amounts of antivirals to be used?
Does the plan have priorities on
the types of antivirals
or drug combinations?
18 17
50 Are there a local distribution
channel to deliver
these antivirals and vaccines?
Hotlines e.g. telephone lines
for requests and local influenza
centres to deliver.
13 22
51 Are there any consideration of
mechanisms to monitor the usefulness
of vaccines, effectiveness, side-effects
and resistance of antivirals
through real time surveillance?
Necessary for efficient and
timely decision-making
8 27
52 Are border screenings in place
and will the cases be followed-up?
Contact tracing e.g. interviewing
patient cases and carrying out
surveys for possible sources?
15 20
53 Are isolation or quarantine rooms
provided at the port of entry?
Rooms to hold suspected cases. 16 19
54 Are there a national annual seasonal
influenza vaccination
programme in place?
Necessary if countries will be able
to vaccinate timely during
the pandemic period.
0 35
55 If yes it is achieving > 75% uptake
in over 65 s and increasing
uptake in occupational
and clinical risk groups?
Vaccinating the elderly and at
risk adults, for example, is
unlikely to establish indirect
protective effects because
these groups represent a small
percentage of the population
among whom the virus spreads.
0 35
56 Are there vaccine uptake figures
or are these published annually?
If the vaccine uptakes are low,
are there plans in educating the
public on attitudes and perceptions?
0 35
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Results
Of the 47 countries in the WHO African region, 35 na-
tional pandemic plans were retrieved for assessment in
this study (Table 2). We could not find plans for 12
countries- either they were not publicly available or we
could not access them from the Ministry of Health in
these countries upon request.
Of the plans reviewed, 60% were initially developed be-
tween 2006 (Table 2) in response to specific threats posed
by the continuing spread of the avian influenza (H5N1)
virus. Figure 1 shows composite scores of preparedness
plans by country. The composite score for the complete-
ness of the pandemic plans was 36% across the 35 coun-
tries. Country-specific scores on each of the thematic
indicators for pandemic plan completeness varied, ranging
from 5% in Côte d’Ivoire to 79% in South Africa (Fig. 1).
Overall, our assessment shows that pandemic plans across
the WHO African region remain inadequate, with no de-
tails on ethical considerations, case investigation and
treatment. Nigeria was the only country that scored 60%
across all the thematic areas of preparedness.
Figure 2 shows completeness of the preparedness plans
of countries by thematic area. On average, preparation
and risk communication scored 48%, respectively, while
coordination and partnership scored highest with an ag-
gregate score of 49%. Surveillance and monitoring scored
34%, while prevention and containment scored 35%. Case
investigation and treatment scored 25% and ethical con-
sideration scored the lowest of 14% across 35 countries.
Table 1 shows the scores of the assessment indicators
for all thematic areas. Of the countries that had a plan
available online, 33 countries planned against both hu-
man and avian influenza subtypes. Three plans- those
from Algeria, Chad and Cote d’Ivoire- specifically fo-
cused on the planning for and response to avian influ-
enza subtypes. 22 of 35 plans followed the WHO
guidance on six phases of planning and response. 14
countries cited hypothetical scenarios on which the plan
is based, for example, when doses of vaccines and antivi-
rals need to be acquired to treat patients. There were 9
plans with planning initiatives at the district and regional
levels, and 7 plans mentioned that they had business
continuity plans across the non-health sector. We found
13 plans to be flexible with regards to the ability to
quickly adjust to the severity of the pandemic. 24
countries had a budget provision for each course of
action, however, all the plans were heavily dependent
on external funding with no sustainable budget for
their preparedness. Maximum funding for some coun-
tries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, was
only 3 years. All but 3 countries- Algeria, Cabo Verde
and Central African Republic- mentioned having a
national committee or advisory body to oversee pre-
paredness. Eight plans tested their planning for and
responses through exercises and drills at the national
level. There were 25 plans that had a national com-
mand and control structure, where influenza data or
epidemiological information is aggregated and shared
Table 1 Standardized checklist and scores for 61 indicators grouped across seven categories (Continued)
INDICATORS RATIONALE SCORES
Additional assessment guide Number of countries
Yes No
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
57 Is there an ethical framework in place? Necessary to avoid ethical
problems that might arise
1 34
58 Are there any ethical consideration
for appropriate use of quarantine
procedures, treatment of
patients with vaccines and antiviral drugs?
Are there priority setting and
equitable access to therapeutic
and prophylactic measures?
What are the core governmental
responsibilities on this?
4 31
59 During implementation of the plan,
are there consideration to
balance public health and human rights?
During a pandemic influenza
emergency, policymakers
experience tension and disputes,
and that they struggle to balance
public health decisions between
what is best for the
individual and society as a whole.
6 29
60 Are there evidence base for public
health measures on which
decisions will be based or are based?
Check in the plans if policymakers use science 6 29
61 Are there transparency, public
engagement and social
mobilization in the plan?
Is there a list that shows the
beneficiaries for the interventions
or how the beneficiaries were
selected as eligible candidates
for the interventions or limited resources?
7 28
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with regional and district levels. Hospital plans were
available in 8 plans and only 4 countries had planned
for exit strategies after the pandemic.
Coordination and partnership indicators showed
that 24 plans engaged local people, families and med-
ical personnel to ensure local services run smoothly
during the pandemic. Another 24 plans had a func-
tional local or regional coordination structure. 12
countries had a private and public partnership to
offer essential services such as the delivery of health,
safety and energy. Ten national plans had a joint co-
operation and partnership with a neighbouring
Fig. 1 Composite scores of preparedness plans by country
Table 2 Country pandemic plans assessed, year of development and last updated
Country Year Country Year
1 Algeria 2009 19 Madagascar 2006
2 Benin 2006/2009 20 Malawi 2006
3 Botswana 2005 21 Mali 2006
4 Burkina Faso 2005 22 Mauritania 2006
5 Cameroon 2006 23 Mauritius 2006
6 Cabo Verde 2006 24 Mozambique 2006
7 Central African Republic (the) 2006 25 Namibia 2005
8 Chad 2006 26 Niger (the) 2006
9 Comoros (the) 2006 27 Nigeria 2007
10 Côte d’Ivoire 2009 28 Rwanda 2006
11 Democratic Republic of the Congo (the) 2006 29 Senegal 2005/2009
12 Gabon 2007 30 Seychelles 2007
13 Gambia (the) 2006/2009 31 Sierra Leone 2005/2009
14 Ghana 2005/2009 32 South Africa 2006/2017
15 Guinea 2006/2009 33 Swaziland 2006
16 Kenya 2005 34 Uganda 2006
17 Lesotho 2006 35 United Republic of Tanzania (the) 2007
18 Liberia 2009
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country on mutually relevant influenza policy. 16
countries held partnership and coordination that in-
volved financial and technical support.
The risk communication indicator showed that 22
plans had a communication strategy and 11 plans men-
tioned the role of public awareness, including sharing in-
formation on the nature, transmission patterns, peak
and decline of the influenza. 31 plans had Information,
Education and Communication (IEC) materials pub-
lished in multi-media such as newspapers, radio, televi-
sion and social networking sites on the internet. 23
plans defined key target groups for specific preventative
messages, such as public hygiene campaigns to highlight
the personal public health measures during normal in-
fluenza seasons or outbreaks. 12 plans planned to avoid
problems arising due to poor communication around
preventative measures and general hygiene. Only 8 plans
mentioned churches or religious groups to assist with
communicating messages on preparedness. 9 countries
had web reporting systems, such as intranet or FluNet, to
speed up responses to an influenza outbreak. Information
exchange among stakeholders through conferences, meet-
ings and forums were mentioned by 17 plans.
Surveillance and monitoring are considered an import-
ant part of planning, yet 17 plans failed to mention the
surveillance techniques of collecting and sharing influ-
enza virological and epidemiological data. This is despite
the presence of the integrated disease surveillance re-
sponse (IDSR) system in many African countries. In
these countries, there was no national influenza centre
(NIC) or influenza assessment centres (IAC) for collect-
ing epidemiological data on influenza-like illnesses and
severe acute respiratory infections. Amongst those that
had a laboratory, 13 countries had the capacity to per-
form virus isolation, typing and subtyping. 9 countries
had a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) machine to test
and monitor influenza circulation. Only six plans had a
computerised hospital system as an early warning system
Fig. 2 Completeness of the preparedness plans of countries by category
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that can readily give real-time data on influenza out-
breaks. Epidemiological and virological data was shared
with the WHO and other partners by 4 countries-
Algeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. There were 16
plans that mentioned having a surveillance working
group to give advice on surveillance and monitoring.
As part of prevention and containment of influenza,
26 countries planned for non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions, such as closure of schools, use of ventilators, use
of personal protective equipment, quarantine, isolation,
hygiene and sanitation. In terms of pharmaceutical inter-
ventions, 29 plans mentioned strategies that would use
vaccines, antivirals and antibiotics for treatment of sec-
ondary infections. With regards to detailed assessment
of the pharmaceutical strategy, we found that 12 plans
had a vaccine strategy, while 17 plans had a procure-
ment strategy for either pharmaceutical or
non-pharmaceuticals products. Only 2 plans, those from
the United Republic of Tanzania and South Africa, had
advanced contracts and agreements with pharmaceutical
companies in place for the supply of equipment and
drugs for influenza treatment. 3 plans, those from the
United Republic of Tanzania, Swaziland and South Af-
rica, had in place accelerated regulatory approval of in-
fluenza products for quick deployment. Additional surge
capacity to improve responses through training and hu-
man resources was available in 21 of the plans. The hos-
pital plans were available in 5 plans and 2 plans (Algeria
and South Africa) mentioned the need for recruiting vol-
unteers from the local community. In terms of human
resource, 4 plans suggested recruitment of staff from a
reserve list of health professionals.
In the category of case investigation and treatment, 8
plans had science based influenza planning assumptions
for efficient and equitable deployment of vital supplies
against influenza. As part of planning, 9 plans included
critical information such as attack rates by age and local-
ity, strain type, antiviral sensitivity or who to target for
prophylaxis. 18 plans mentioned the criteria and types of
antivirals to use in an event of an outbreak. The most
commonly mentioned antivirals were zanamivir and
oseltamivir. About 13 plans mentioned that they will de-
liver these antivirals through local distribution channels,
including the use of telephone line and local influenza
centres. Mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness, side
effects and resistance of vaccines or antivirals were con-
sidered in 8 plans through real time surveillance. Plans
to screen cases at the borders and follow up cases were
indicated in 15 plans, while isolation or the provision of
rooms at the border entry were only mentioned in 16
plans. No plan reported the intention to vaccinate sea-
sonally (i.e. achieving > 75 uptake in the elderly popula-
tion), nor published any vaccination figures despite
indicating that they will vaccinate its population.
Ethical consideration was inadequately reported in
most plans, with only 1 plan (South Africa) having com-
pletely reported to have an ethical framework in place. 4
plans considered an ethically appropriate use of quaran-
tine procedures, fair allocation of treatment and limited
resources such as vaccines. 6 plans considered how to
balance between public health and human rights inter-
ests if they came into conflict. 7 of the plans indicated
the need for transparency in decision making, for ex-
ample, how eligible beneficiaries would be selected to re-
ceive scarce interventions.
Discussion
Preparing for a response towards a pandemic extends
beyond the development of the plan to include an imple-
mentation plan that lays out how the goals of the plan
match available resources, tasks and responsibilities, to
meet the needs of the population affected by the pan-
demic outcomes. Preparedness plans are crucial to build
frameworks for emergency response, thereby providing
countries with the opportunity to plan, strategise and
mobilise human and capital resources before a pandemic
occurs. Adequate and thorough plans ensure that coun-
tries can respond immediately when a pandemic is
declared.
While our study showed that the majority of the Afri-
can countries have a plan (74%), the majority of these
plans are inadequate, with many tasks necessary to ad-
dress pandemic threats of the twenty-first century re-
mains unmet. This finding corresponds to studies that
evaluated preparedness plans and responses to the 2009
H1N1 pandemic in Ghana and Malawi, where such
plans were found to be weak and unable to elicit the
most desired responses during the pandemic [15, 16].
The findings of this study also concur with an evaluation
done by Ortu et al. (2008), who reported that the plans
lacked operational clarity and focus of the planning ob-
jectives [17].
Our findings indicate that the majority of plans have
not been updated over time, despite the lessons offered
by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Our findings also show
that only 7 of the assessed countries in Africa updated
or revised their plans periodically to incorporate the
changing circumstances and lessons gathered from the
2009 pandemic. For instance, South Africa is one of the
countries with consistent updates to its plan, with a re-
cently developed five-year national influenza policy and
strategic plan outlining a comprehensive approach to in-
fluenza prevention and control [18]. A plan needs to be
a living document, periodically adapted as new informa-
tion on the influenza becomes available and thus ready
to provide a guide to the protocols, procedures, and div-
ision of responsibilities in emergency response [12].
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Results of our study also suggest that many countries
did not consider the proposed phases of preparedness to
respond more efficiently to the influenza pandemic. This
is despite the fact that the WHO has provided an
up-to-date evidence-based guidance to support countries
to develop and revise pandemic preparedness plans. Re-
cently, the WHO published an updated pandemic influ-
enza preparedness checklist to help Members States
build capacity for pandemic response [14]. However, our
review highlights how many countries in the WHO Afri-
can region are yet to incorporate these guidelines despite
the need to improve existing plans.
Our study also shows that many countries do not have
business continuity plans across the non-health sector at
the subnational level. An influenza pandemic is an un-
predictable event that can create a major management
crisis of unprecedented scale and cost. High absence of
workers from duty could drastically interrupt the func-
tioning of critical infrastructure, such as services essen-
tial to health, technology and communication networks,
economic wellbeing, safety and security. Due to the dis-
ruptive nature of the pandemic to social services and the
economy, development of business continuity plans em-
bedded within the national plan is critical for an effective
country response that minimizes the financial conse-
quences on all businesses of all sizes and types [19].
In our study, we observed that only a few national
plans engaged with specific sectors, such as education,
hospitals, industry and local community. It is useful for
plans to make meaningful arrangements at the local
level, because this is where the burden of the disease oc-
curs and is largely felt. In addition, in the aftermath of
the pandemic, the local level is where the plans can con-
tinue to be implemented. Interestingly, apart from local
coordination, we found that few countries had joint co-
operation and partnership from non-health sector in
preparedness, thus making interoperability and integra-
tion of planning efforts and services impossible. The
purpose of planning and involving cooperation and part-
nership at all levels is to support and promptly restore
key routines and functions prone to disruptions in our
societies. Even a well-designed and motivated plan with-
out partnerships will fall short in managing the crisis,
and will struggle to guide recovery effectively if it does
not extend responsibilities and command across local
government, stakeholders and international partners.
Although surveillance is considered one of the most
crucial planning activities, in this study we found that
half of the plans did not incorporate the techniques of
collecting virological and epidemiological data for the
early detection of the virus causing an epidemic. The
majority of the surveillance plans in place were weak.
The role of surveillance techniques and systems is to
send early signals of an imminent influenza outbreak in
the human and animal population, and yield knowledge
for treatment, prevention and control of influenza [20].
For many plans, it was impossible to fulfill these tasks in
the absence of laboratories and equipment, such as PCR
machines to perform virus typing and subtyping. Ac-
cording to the IHRs, all countries are mandated to
monitor and rapidly report disease outbreaks that pose a
threat to other countries [11]. Apart from alerting re-
spective countries about the nature of the influenza virus
in circulation, understanding disease virology can be
useful for vaccine production. However, without the ne-
cessary tools to conduct surveillance, public health inter-
ventions to reduce influenza pandemic are jeopardized.
An interesting finding from this study was that 26
countries proposed to use non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions (case isolation, restricting children’s visits to hospi-
tals, workplace closure etc.), while nearly all indicated
the use of pharmaceutical interventions i.e. vaccines, an-
tivirals and antibiotics for treatment of secondary infec-
tions. Although vaccines are a primary strategy for
preventing and mitigating influenza outbreaks, many
plans do not specify whether vaccines will be acquired
on time. Since influenza viruses change overtime due to
the antigenic shifts and drifts, it is difficult to produce
an appropriate and effective influenza vaccine for un-
known subtypes [20].
As such, during the first few months of a pandemic in-
fluenza, vaccination will not be a primary intervention
strategy. The time during which there are no vaccines,
combined approaches of non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions can minimize morbidity and mortality due to influ-
enza pandemic. There is no point in making
arrangements to use vaccines (including other treat-
ments products and materials) when these products will
not be available or are unlikely to be supplied within a
useful time frame to mitigate the disease. If specific ar-
rangements are proposed, then plans should take into
account both the limitations and the capabilities of the
responses.
Most importantly, although often forgotten in the ma-
jority of the preparedness plans is the need for ethical
considerations. Our study indicates that, with the excep-
tion of one plan (South Africa), no other plans reported
having an ethical framework in place. There is an ex-
pectation that during a pandemic influenza outbreak,
ethical issues will arise due to conflicting interests be-
tween civil liberties (i.e. violation of human rights) and
population health (i.e. greatest good for the greatest
number) [20]. In the absence of an ethical plan, it is dif-
ficult to respond appropriately to ethical dilemmas and
this can constitute a threat to preparedness and re-
sponse. We propose that all countries develop an ethical
framework that can be used to address ethical problems
such as these of rationing limited vaccines or failure by
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health care-workers to work on the bedside during the
pandemic.
Our study has several limitations. Our analysis was
based on pandemic plans that are freely available online
and thus it is possible that some of these plans would
have been updated and the revised versions of the plans
not yet published. Our study may therefore be a misrep-
resentation of the preparedness. We were only able to
assess written materials in the protocols, yet crisis pre-
paredness extends beyond these documents to include
the ability to perform within the means using the neces-
sary and available tools and infrastructure. Thus, we are
not suggesting that countries that scored high in the
completeness scores for preparedness will do the same
in real crisis situations. However, for country prepared-
ness to be truly effective at preventing and responding
to influenza, plans must be created and drills and exer-
cises conducted to ensure they prevent and address in-
fluenza pandemic. Another limitation involved the
process of scoring the plans without a weighting scale,
which may have introduced bias especially among those
indicators that fell between 1 and 0. A further methodo-
logical limitation involved scoring the same plan twice
i.e. the initial draft and updated version. As such, coun-
tries with more than one national plan may have been
more likely to achieve a higher score, thus skewing the
scores for those plans. Finally, we used google transla-
tion software to translate French plans into English and
thus some words may have been lost in translation. Most
importantly, we excluded one French written plan
(Togo) from the analysis because the format of the plan
made it unable to be translated.
Conclusion
Based on our assessment of the plans, we found pre-
paredness plans to be weak therefore, these plans must
address the gaps identified in this study. We recommend
improving the overall goals in preparedness and these
are achievable through drills, simulations and tabletop
exercises.
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